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Recent advances in anti-malware technologies have steered the security industry away from maintaining 
vast signature databases and into newer defense technologies such as behavior blocking, application 
white-listing and others. Most would agree that the reasoning behind this is to keep up with the arms 
race established between malware writers and the security community almost three decades ago. Still, 
malware writers have not as yet created new paradigms. Indeed, malicious code development is still 
largely limited to code pattern changes utilizing polymorphic and metamorphic engines, as well as 
executable packer and wrapper technologies. Each new malware instance retains the exact same core 
functionality as its ancestor and only alters the way it looks. What if, instead, malware were able to 
change its function or behavior autonomously? What if, in the absence of human intervention, computer 
viruses resembled biological viruses in their ability to adapt to new defense technologies as soon as they 
came into effect? In this paper, we will provide the theoretical proof behind malware implementation 
that closely models Darwinian evolution. Biological viruses are under constant attack by immune 
systems and artificial drugs. Yet they systematically manage to evolve new functionalities that 
circumvent such countermeasures, leading to recurrent epidemics. According to the biological analogy, 
evolvable malware will be able to alter its functionality by autonomously incorporating behaviors freely 
available to it by the numerous discoverable APIs. The new behavior profiles would be constantly 
screened by security software in the same way natural selection acts on biological organisms. In the end, 
the malware instances that are better equipped to survive countermeasures will be able to proliferate 
more efficiently. Such malware pose a real threat to the current methods of detection due to the vast 
numbers of functions they can adopt and that cannot possibly be screened for. Furthermore, it is likely 
that clean-program functionality will be favored amongst such behaviors since it shields malware that is 
mimicking clean programs from behavior blocking. As a consequence, we predict that behavior-based 
virus detection would quickly become ineffective if malware can evolve based on the Darwinian 
paradigm. 
During 2007 alone, attackers created over 700,000 new malicious programs [1,2]. While this 
number appears daunting, modern antivirus (AV) systems have dealt with this crop successfully 
every year, by using sophisticated signature and behavior detection techniques. All of the new 
viruses are, as far as we know, the product of human engineering. Here we discuss the 
possibility of an alternative form of design: the emergence of novel function in an autonomously 
evolving piece of malware.  
The possibility of autonomously evolving computer programs is not new. Artificial Life (“Alife”) 
researchers have studied self-replicators in computer environments since 1979 [3], and the first 
autonomously mutating self-replicating computer programs were introduced by Ray in 1992 [4]. 
More recent systems such as the Avida platform have established that Darwinian evolution of 
computer programs can be used to study evolutionary biology and genetics [5,6].  As opposed 
to computer malware, Alife systems are squarely aimed at the research environment. In these 
systems, the code is implemented with small, well-defined instruction sets that are highly 
evolvable, that is, the probability that a mutation leads to another functional program is high (of 
the order of several to tens of percents).  Most standard computer languages are not robust in 
this manner. For example, the x86 instruction set only tolerates very few mutations (on the 
order of fractions of a percent of the code [7]). Alife systems also differ in that they implement 
simulated environments where specific program behaviors are rewarded. While this setting is 
very different from the standard computer malware paradigm, computer virus researchers 
hinted at the idea of autonomously evolving malware already in the early 1990s [8]. In 
particular, Spafford performed an exhaustive review of computer viruses under the Artificial 
Life perspective confirming the absence of functional evolution in such programs [9]. Although 
the possibility of an autonomously evolving virus—as the one discussed here—was mentioned, 
it was quickly dismissed as a task too daunting requiring a very large implementation, possibly 
larger than the OS itself.  More recently, the idea has resurfaced, with a higher emphasis this 
time on the outcome [10] and the possible mechanics of its emergence [11]. We argue here 
that apart from a hint and some failed implementation attempts (e.g., W32/Zellome, see [12]), 
self-evolving malware has yet to appear. The concept itself, however, is relatively simple, and 
the consequences of the release of evolving malware should be studied. 
 
Darwinian evolution versus malware evolution  
Evolution as a process requires the presence of three simple elements: replication, variation and 
differential fitness. Replication allows for inheritance, and in particular the inheritance of 
variations, introduced by different mechanisms of mutation. These variations are then selected 
for or against via the competition of individuals over limited resources. The competition leads 
to differential fitness, i.e., differences in reproductive success between individuals within a 
population. Mutations that provide organisms with a reproductive advantage over others 
(beneficial mutations) will tend to propagate to future generations. It is important to note that 
the fraction of beneficial mutations (among all those that can occur) is usually very small, with 
most mutations being deleterious and the rest neutral. Nonetheless, given the long time scale 
available to biological evolution along with large population sizes, such gradual stepwise 
beneficial changes will lead to the emergence of complexity [13]. Some have argued that neither 
the geological timescales nor the large populations that are germane to biological evolution will 
be available to evolving computer malware. However, generation times for computer viruses 
are many orders of magnitude shorter than even bacterial generation times, and furthermore 
selective pressures are expected to be much stronger and mutation rates higher, speeding up 
evolution [14]. We should note here that geological times, in contrast to popular belief, are not 
a prerequisite for the appearance of evolutionary change, even in biological evolution. The 
emergence of new functional complexity on much smaller time scales than geological ones has 
recently been observed in very different experiments. A 36-year experiment with lizards for 
example has shown that such a comparatively short time frame is sufficient for major adaptive 
morphological changes to arise, such as novel morphological structures in the form of cecal 
valves [15]. Also, in a long-term experiment with E. coli bacteria, one particular strain evolved 
the ability to metabolize a new carbon source (citrate) after about 31,500 generations, a 
complex adaptation that required a multitude of mutations [16]. Given the drastically shorter 
generation time of computer viruses, generations of this order of magnitude can be achieved 
within weeks at most.  
During the three decades of their existence, computer viruses have moved from simple 
replicators to advanced polymorphic and metamorphic implementations [17]. The underlying 
goal of this progression has been to increase the variability of the virus’ signature to the point 
that tracking different instances of the same virus becomes too daunting a task. Nonetheless, 
even for the most sophisticated metamorphic viruses [18], the specific functionality and overall 
behavior of the virus remain intact. Signature obfuscation, or as we will refer to it here as 
“cryptic variation”, will not allow for the discovery of new functionality. What true Darwinian 
evolution can accomplish is vastly different, because it is the process responsible for the de novo 
generation of all of the complexity of life.  
The variation observed in surviving lineages of biological viruses (as compared to their 
ancestors) is a direct result of information “exchange” between the virus and its environment. 
Simply put, biological viruses are constantly testing new ways of exploiting environmental 
resources via the process of mutation. In contrast, computer viruses do not exhibit such traits, 
relying instead on changing their appearance to avoid detection. Functional (as opposed to 
cryptic) variation, such as the discovery of a new exploit or the mimicry of non-malicious 
behavior masking malicious actions, is not part of the arsenal of current malware. While there 
are examples of functional variation that have occurred by chance (reviewed below in support 
of our hypothesis) there are no examples of computer malware that exhibits intentional 
functional change between generations. In the absence of functional variation, differential fitness 
will never be realized in computer viruses since the reproductive success of offspring remains 
unchanged. In the event that a behavioral signature is developed for the virus, the entire 
population, including the cryptic variants, is affected equally. In this case, the 
functional/behavioral uniformity of the virus population would force all of it to extinction by the 
countermeasure. Functional variants, on the other hand, because of the variation in behavior, 
can escape behavior-based detection methods. Below, we investigate the theoretical possibility 
of functional variation in computer viruses and their consequences. 
 
Model implementation  
Suppose, malware M is comprised of an arbitrary number of malicious functions: 
 M = {M1, M2, M3, …, MN} . 
An evolutionary function EF ∈ Μ, is introduced into the existing set: 
 
M = {M1, M2, M3, …, MN, EF} . 
 
EF has the ability to generate new functional code N after each generation of M, with a given 
probability. This can be achieved by different methods, including via the insertion of code 
extracted from randomly selected APIs present in the malware’s native environment (for 
example, extraction of function calls that are part of the Windows API). Alternatively, in the 
case of a script threat, extraction of script code from other scripts might also serve the same 
purpose. In any case, the resulting malware M now consists of the set 
M(EF) = {M1, M2, M3,… MN, EF, N1..Nm}, where N=N(EF). 
The newly generated function N need not necessarily be malicious. Also, the Mi might trigger 
antivirus responses individually or as a combination of each other. The malware M(EF) is now 
an evolvable threat. 
Researchers that envisioned how autonomously evolving malware could be coded have largely 
focused on binary code manipulation [8,11]. The high percentage of lethal mutations that would 
be experienced by such malware (due to the brittleness of the code) would forbid evolution 
from occurring. Consequently, the need for an “evolvable” language or meta-language of 
implementation becomes apparent. While some work in this direction has been undertaken [7], 
the prospects for such a design are daunting. By relying instead on functional code that is 
already present in the malware’s environment, the problem is reduced to finding a way of 
adopting that functionality in the malware code, instead of creating a language that can code for 
that functionality autonomously.  
Another major consideration with such an implementation is the actual coding of EF itself, as it 
might appear to represent a static component for which a signature could be produced. 
However, the EF could use any number of advanced polymorphic or metamorphic engines to 
hide itself from detection. The ongoing effort by the antivirus community to avoid maintaining 
the large signature databases of the past, combined with the advanced metamorphic engines 
used by viruses such as W95/Zmist [19] make a cryptic EF implementation feasible. In fact, it is 
highly probable that EF’s presence can be fully disguised by M. By simulating non-malicious 
behavior for example, malware would at best be classified as a false positive even if EF is 
detectable. Given the antivirus industry’s aversion to false positives, it is conceivable that 
malware would exploit this loophole and autonomously and forcefully mimic clean application 
behavior.  
 
Functional evolution in current security environments  
Adapting to security environments can be illustrated via a number of examples. In this section, 
we list several ways in which random changes can lead to evasion of detection from behavior-
and signature-based blocking as well as application white-listing.  
Clean-application mimicry. AV systems are usually designed with a bias to avoid false 
positives. This bias creates a loophole that can be exploited by functional adaptation, because as 
the number of detections by an AV system increases so do the false positives of each product. 
As a consequence, the AV industry attempts to reduce the footprint of signatures, but this can 
significantly amplify the risks of exploitation by programs that have learned to mimic clean 
applications either by behavior or by signature.  
Imagine that a program imports API function “Foo”, which makes it similar to programs that 
create false positives for the AV system. As a result, the presence of function Foo excludes that 
program from the attention of behavioral blocking. This problem exists even if the system uses 
weighting, as long as the negative weights to identify possible clean applications can be simulated 
by the newly evolved functions in malware M. There are analogies for this type of evolutionary 
adaptation in biology. Some viruses have evolved a set of proteins that mimic precisely those 
proteins that are involved in combating the virus (the so-called complement regulator proteins 
[20]), or else by mimicking a protein that the immune system uses to recognize viruses (so-
called Fc proteins [21]). In both cases, the immune system is fooled into treating the virus as 
“clean” because it looks like part of the immune system itself.   
If malware M appears to have an application user interface, it will most likely be classified as a 
clean application because typical malware does not have one. In another example, if malware M 
is not packaged or wrapped, it might appear much less suspicious. Malware writers use packers 
extensively to hide signatures from AV scanners. One of the cheapest ways for attackers to do 
this is to use run-time packers or wrappers on top of the existing malware. As a result, 
malware released in packed form might look much more suspect than a non-packed version.  
Evolving malware capable to present itself in both packed and unpacked forms would create 
new challenges for heuristics. There is a parallel to this evasion technique in biological viruses. 
In fact, often a body’s immune system triggers on the envelope (or capsid) of a virus. As a 
consequence, some viruses have adapted to an infection mode without an envelope and capsid 
(for example, the viroids [22]).  The reverse strategy also exists, where viruses such as the 
herpes viruses, in an attempt to masquerade themselves as host cells, create elaborate 
envelopes from host cell membranes that contain a series of host-unique markers on them. 
Such envelopes allow the herpes virus to evade host detection and suppress immune responses 
[22]. 
White-listing deception. The practice of application white-listing offers another exploit 
for evolvable malware. Because the number of known applications is already very high, typically 
application white-listing only focuses on executable applications (such as Portable Executable 
files on Windows systems). As a consequence, attacks originating from other types of objects 
(such as documents) are not controllable by these systems. Malware that is not presented in an 
executable form would thus be excluded from the attention of white-listing systems completely. 
Self-evolving executable malware that could convert itself to new forms, for example via 
executable-to-script-conversion, would pose a challenge to any white-listing system.  Instead of 
presenting itself as an executable, the code might rewrite itself as a macro in a document, or as 
a command-line script.  
Another problem appears if there are no file objects involved, as in the case of the 
W32/CodeRed family that target a white-listed application in memory over the network. Not 
surprisingly, when such threats emerge for the first time, they often cause an epidemic. While 
in-memory threats are not common, their presence is expected to rise if there is a need to 
adapt to a known white-listing solution. 
Another scenario involving white-listing deception could be the following. Suppose a program 
creates large populations of clean programs that it distributes over the web. However, the 
clean programs are designed in such a way that their MD5 hash is identical to its own 
(malicious) self [23]. Because white-listing applications collect executables from a variety of 
“trusted” sources, the wide distribution of clean “twin” programs could have the result of 
white-listing the malicious version. Thus, such an attack can exploit both application white-
listing as well as application reputation systems, which score applications based on their 
popularity among users with good reputation. A simple biological example of such an attack is 
represented by the evasion of the DNA methylation defense of bacteria. Bacteria tag their own 
DNA with a methyl group, and cut up any DNA inside the cell that does not carry such a group 
(the methylation is the analogue of an MD5 hash). Viruses have emerged that have learned to 
emulate these tags (white-listing themselves in the process) and thus escape detection. 
Virtual Machine anti-emulation. It is conceivable that the size of a long function loop, 
or a function that calculates parameters to function calls on the fly, could be artificially 
increased by malware. In such a case, the resulting novel functions N might accidentally create 
an anti-emulation feature for a virtual machine by exhausting the emulators preset upper limit 
iteration number to examine the program. This way, M will be capable to compete with an 
emulator, thus exploiting this feature for its own survival. In this case, the threat will be capable 
to circumvent not only behavioral blockers that rely on emulators, but also a scanner’s built-in 
heuristics analyzers as well. Random sequences of APIs with parameter-check can also 
introduce such issues. This trick is often used by existing polymorphic threats as an anti-
emulation feature. The W95/Drill family of viruses utilized random calls to a predefined set of 
APIs to confuse emulators. Later on, the Storm Worm attacks (that created the Storm botnet) 
delivered thousands of copies of different malware executables that utilized layers such as 
W32/Tibs on them to confuse antivirus products. The API sets used were changed by the 
attackers regularly to reduce chances of detections based on the presence of such an API 
profile. A self-evolving threat would carry this feature by its own nature, as it can create new 
code, and verification functions for them. We are not aware of a biological analogy for this 
trick.  
Evasion by proxy. Even security products such as personal firewalls can be affected by self-
evolving threats. Suppose threat M has a feature to proxy behavior using another executable. 
While the threat may have several malicious features, it has the option to either execute them 
itself, or by using a running application as a proxy instead. As a result, when executing the 
communication via a trusted application, the threat can remain undetected when 
communicating to an outside location (such as the command control channel of a bot network). 
Alternatively, all malicious features might be separated among several processes as threads. 
Imagine that a set of threads from a set of processes together constitutes a malicious program. 
Yet, on its own, each feature might not be triggering the attention of heuristics or the behavior 
blocking engine, allowing the threat to escape attention.   
Trust relationships can also introduce problems. For example, Windows Vista does not allow 
an executable to alter certain file permissions, even if an administrator executes the application. 
Still, using a script such permissions can be changed. For example, files such as kernel32.dll and 
their permissions can only be changed by so called Trusted Installers who have full control over 
these files (see Appendix A). If one tries to change the permission using CACLS.EXE from the 
Resource Kit, the attempt will fail because this executable cannot be used to take ownership of 
files, since it is not being trusted. Yet, one can use XCACLS.VBS, and execute it with 
CSCRIPT.EXE. The script is trusted, since the script interpreter is a trusted application. This 
means that threats can potentially evolve by changing their representative forms (such as the 
particular language environment they use) to develop adaptive features to a security 
environment. What an executable is not able to do due to security restrictions might be 
achievable as soon as the threat feature is executed as a script. In addition, using a trusted 
proxy such as EXPLORER.EXE on Vista, a threat can take ownership of files that otherwise it 
would not be allowed to do (for example using code injection techniques to become part of the 
process address space of Explorer in memory.) 
Environment-induced functional variation. New functionality can emerge as a result 
of environmental effects. Many web sites, for example, change the code within HTML files on 
the client side arbitrarily by presenting extra functionality to the user. In particular, links to 
advertisement messages can be replaced with actual content.  In other cases, scripts are 
inserted into pages, and changed on an ongoing basis (see Appendix B.) Such effects could 
change actual malware code, rendering AV scanners incapable of identifying the threat.  
We have seen several verified cases in the past where random corruptions to virus code 
resulted in a new variant of the virus that renders it undetected by security software. For 
example, a variation of the W95/CIH family exists that is the result of such a corruption: the 
replica escaped the attention of most scanners when the natural modification happened to a 
piece of its nonessential code, without altering the threat’s replication functionality. In another 
case, an error in Microsoft Word resulted in the creation of thousands of macro virus variants 
via random corruptions. These macro-body corruptions were often ignored by the macro 
interpreter due to the existence of error handlers in the original virus code. As a consequence, 
these Word-induced variations could easily result in surviving mutations, as long as a single 
MacroCopy() command responsible for the successful replication of the threat was still present 
unchanged. 
Malware code merging. A threat might be able to snatch code from another program in 
its environment. We have seen examples of a virus like Pinfi jumping on top of worms to 
replicate in new environments as a combination threat. Security products do not always 
recognize the worm once it is infected with a virus, and the combination helps the survival of 
both threats. Disinfected worm copies can also escape attention, as can copies of worm 
replicas that changed due to transfer of code over network channels. It is conceivable that an 
evolutionary function in the malware could snatch clean or malicious code from other 
programs. It could integrate code from other programs by identifying function prolog and epilog 
code. When this takes place, a function is safely inserted into the code base of the evolutionary 
virus as a new “function” by running the newly acquired code as a new thread. Existing features 
might be replaced by the code, which could end up producing reliable output to a given input. 
(For example, as long as function X returns values greater than 0, it is accepted.) Even complete 
functionality might be snatched from another clean program, or another virus as well. As 
previously predicted [17], a cooperation protocol can enhance sharing of features between 
malicious executables as well. Code snatching is a tried and true function of almost all biological 
organisms. Bacteria exchange code in small segments called plasmids, while viruses routinely 
integrate bacterial code into their own. Often, viruses carry this piece of code to other 
bacteria, a phenomenon known as transduction.  
A form of evolution was observed in macro viruses, which often merge their code base into a 
document. (Note that the integration of viral code into the host code is the default action for 
several biological viruses, e.g. HIV [24].) Often the file has a clean macro, and a virus with a set 
of macros. In addition, another virus may insert its set of macros at the same time, leading to 
viral macro code merging with both viral and clean macro code. In biology, this phenomenon is 
quite common, and known as coinfection. For example, during a mode of viral reproduction 
termed “lysogenic”, viruses such as bacteriophages integrate their genome into the host’s 
genome and become dormant. When such viruses convert back to the lytic (aggressive) mode 
of reproduction, they excise themselves from the genome. In the event of coinfection, the 
excised viral genome might be a combination of more than one viral strain leading to the 
creation of chimeric viral particles. Taking these lessons back to computer malware, we predict 
that while this merging of code is still manageable for the antivirus programs, cases when a 
clean macro is merged with a parasitic macro virus might not be. Imagine a random change that 
results in the macro code becoming very large, either as the result of several layers of merged 
code or additional polymorphisms. This can easily exhaust typical scanning engines for macro 
viruses due to memory limitations reserved for the macro code within the engines. As a 
consequence, an evolved copy can potentially escape just by being too large.  
Code snatching can also lead to detection evasion if the snatched code is clean, and triggers the 
heuristic based on code snippet based exclusions, leading to effects similar to those mentioned 
under the heading “Clean application mimicry”. Once a copy of the malware snatches the code 
snippet "exclude" from a clean program and presents it within itself at the right place, the 
scanner might ignore the malware. While the scanner would trigger on the rest of the code, 
the exclusion forces it to fail. Such exclusion strings were extracted from several AV systems in 
the past, and shared among attackers to include it in viruses [25]. As this example shows, it is 
not necessary for a human to disassemble the antivirus programs to gain this knowledge: 
random code snatching can easily produce it. And once it is produced it will flourish, as it will 
escape detection. 
 
How far can evolution go?  
We have reviewed numerous examples of non-evolution-induced adaptations to security 
environments, leading to unintended functional gains by malware. The question that arises from 
these examples is whether small malware code changes—even if collected under a single 
malware implementation—are sufficient for the evolution of the functional complexity exhibited 
by biological viruses. Let us first consider how much functionality and complexity can possibly 
be generated by the process of random changes and subsequent selection. Biologists often use 
the vertebrate eye as an example of how complexity can arise through evolution. It is rather 
difficult to imagine such an organ with its hundreds of millions of photocells and hundreds of 
different chemicals required to process a single image being created from scratch. Instead, it is 
easier to imagine a historical succession of eyes that differ only slightly from each other, and 
where one originates from the other via only small gradual changes or mutations. In a collection 
of all possible mutations a version of the eye can undergo, large ones are statistically more 
improbable than smaller ones. Hence, a long string of such small mutations occurring gradually 
through geological time could connect ancestral versions of the eye to more recent highly 
functional ones that have the look and feel of design. If we were to follow all these changes 
through time, it would become apparent instead that ancestral versions are only slightly 
different from their direct descendants. Indeed, we can see just such a succession of changes 
when looking at the vast variety of eyes and eye-like structures present in surviving species. 
From pigment enriched light-sensitive spots in some single-celled animals to elementary eye-like 
pigmented cavities in several shellfish, the evolution of eye structures can be mapped out [26]. 
By analogy, we can imagine the emergence of arbitrary complexity in autonomously evolving 
computer viruses. The myriad examples mentioned above of unintended virus behaviors due to 
random changes are all examples of more complex behaviors originating from simpler ones 
through small programming jumps. As in biology, the collection of software and APIs in an 
operating system environment is sufficient for providing a pool of features that a virus can 
choose to sample. Those features that provide the virus with an evolutionary advantage (e.g., 
escaping detection, infecting different platforms, etc.) will be propagated, leading to 
unanticipated complex behaviors. The only question that remains is whether such a sequence of 
events is likely within time frames much shorter than the geological time available to the 
biological process. Lenski et al. have shown that complex functionality can evolve from much 
simpler functions in Artificial Life platforms, over the course of a few days [13], and complex 
adaptations have been seen to emerge after tens to tens of thousands of generations [15,16], 
easily within range of weeks of malware evolution.  
Research in Artificial Life of the sort mentioned earlier has identified a number of important 
parameters that need to be satisfied before complexity can evolve. First and foremost are of 
course the three conditions for Darwinian evolution themselves: replication, variation and 
selection. Of those, replication and selection are naturally present, and we argued above that 
variation can occur via a variety of mechanisms. However, in order for sufficient variation to be 
present so that selection can act efficiently, population sizes should be large. Finally, the number 
of variants (mutants) with non-zero fitness (sometimes called the neutral fraction of mutants) 
should be sizable. It has been shown that ideally between 10%-40% of all mutations experienced 
by a population need to be neutral to ensure evolvability [7]. (Note that the fraction of mutants 
of biological proteins is also in that range [27].) Neutrality enables the organism to better 
sample the pool of available mutations by being able to discover beneficial mutants without 
constantly being penalized by the already high frequency of deleterious mutations. Beneficial 
mutations are hard to come by in a single try, but can become more likely if interspersed by a 
series of neutral ones. In essence, neutral mutations allow organisms to buy more time in their 
quest for discovering survivability-enhancing traits. Applying this lesson back to computer 
language implementations, it is easy to see why mutating binary code would make it rather 
impossible to discover new functionality: the fraction of neutral changes is just too low. On the 
contrary, integration of pieces of functional code and/or importing functions and APIs available 
in the computer environment have a much higher probability of being neutral, and very rarely 
even beneficial. 
Through several experiments it was shown that Alife organisms could indeed evolve complexity 
as long as the intermediate steps that lead to it could be sampled, i.e., the simple functions that 
are required to build more complex ones can be attained via mutations [13]. It is also 
interesting to note that this complexity was attained by different populations in a variety of 
environments, hinting at what biologists refer to as convergent evolution. If a trait produces a 
significant survival advantage to an organism (be it eye, wings, lungs etc.), it will be evolved by 
unrelated organisms that occupy different environments, in one form or another. What does 
this mean for computer malware? If computer malware are implemented using the principles of 
Darwinian evolution and an implementation construct allowing sufficient neutrality, the 
emergence of complex adaptive behaviors becomes an expected result rather than an 
improbability, as long as exploitable opportunities exist within the malware’s environment. We 
have here listed a number of those, and are certain that many more can be imagined. 
 
Conclusion  
It has already been discussed by other researchers that no virus detection algorithm can detect 
all possible viruses, known and unknown [28,29]. The same researchers have also mentioned 
the possibility of a Darwinian evolution-based malware implementation. So far, no one has 
attempted to investigate how feasible such an implementation is or assessed the implications it 
could have, given the current methods of detection. We have shown here through a series of 
historical malware examples as well as a theoretical implementation model that a truly 
undetectable virus might be more feasible than previously imagined. By using an evolutionary 
function, computer malware could implement traits and tricks that allow them to mimic clean 
application behavior, have themselves white-listed, avoid signature-based detection, or recruit 
proxies to do their bidding. More importantly, malware could conceivably alter its functionality 
so as to discover new exploits or find new platforms to infect, with the same ease that 
biological viruses gain immunity to antiviral drugs, or adapt to new hosts.  
The development of sophisticated encryption techniques and metamorphic viruses has led to 
weakened performance of AV systems based on databases of signatures alone. Behavior-based 
detection, (relying instead on libraries of behaviors obtained from emulation or from runtime 
code on the system) have been developed as a stop-gap measure. If malware is developed that 
can evolve via Darwinian principles, behavior-based blocking is weakened too, as the discovery 
of even trivial new functionality would have the potential to evade detection. Would there be 
no defense against such viruses? The answer to this question is currently unclear. The general 
problem of computer virus detection is inherently an integrity problem, and thus managing 
integrity is essential for the protection of the system. Yet, as the examples for evolution of 
malware threats have demonstrated, over time the definition of integrity may need to be 
continuously updated. On the one hand, it is clear that the emergence of an evolvable threat 
could be potentially disastrous. On the other hand, it is entirely possible that evolution will in 
most cases lead to harmless forms of a threat, as is often observed in biology. Finally, even 
though both the signature and the behavior of an evolvable threat may be highly variable, it is 
still possible that such threats rely on common algorithmic features for which detection 
methods can be developed. What these commonalities are is, of course, presently unknown.  
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Appendix A - Permissions of kernel32.dll on Vista  
 
 
Appendix B  
a.) Viewing the main page of Yahoo at 11:55:15  
<script 
language=javascript>ULT_KEY='X3oDMTUxcGV1M3FzBGNjA3VzBHlwdWxzZQNjb25zZXJyBHB
hAy0xBHBjaWQDTmV3c19Nb3N0X1JlY29tbWVuZGVkX2VsaV9tYW5uaW5nX3N1cGVyYm93bF81Qi0
3MDc5NDEEcHBpZAMxMjAyMTEwMjgwBGZwY2sDUjZkdHFnRUEEdG1wbANpbmRleC1sBF9TAzI3MTY
xNDkEcGlkAzEyMDIxNTQzNjMEdGVzdAMw';</script><!-- pbt 1202154363 --><script 
language=javascript>  
if(window.yzq_p==null)document.write("<scr"+"ipt 
language=javascript  
src=http://l.yimg.com/us.js.yimg.com/lib/bc/bc_2.0.4.js></scr"+"ipt>")
;  
</script><script language=javascript>  
if(window.yzq_p)yzq_p('P=Cyq4LtGDJJVLM60kR6dtL9SZDJs6tUenbaMAA..D&T=13tld
je64%2fX%3d1202154915%2fE%3d2716149%2fR%3dyahoo_top%2fK%3d5%2fV%3d1.1%2fW%3d
J%2fY%3dYAHOO%2fF%3d1101005185%2fS%3d1%2fJ%3d952483D1');  
if(window.yzq_s)yzq_s();  
</script><noscript><img width=1 height=1 alt="" src="http:// 
us.bc.yahoo.com/b?P=Cyq4LtGDJJVLM60kR6dtL9SZDJs6tUenbaMAA..D&T=1420ruvld%2f
X%3d1202154915%2fE%3d2716149%2fR%3dyahoo_top%2fK%3d5%2fV%3d3.1%2fW%3dJ%2fY 
%3dYAHOO%2fF%3d1142761950%2fQ%3d-1%2fS%3d1%2fJ%3d952483D1"></noscript>  
<!-- f22.www.sp1.yahoo.com compressed/chunked Mon Feb 4 11:55:15 PST 
2008 
-->  
 
b.) Viewing the main page of Yahoo at 11:56:17. Differences to previous page are in bold.  
<script 
language=javascript>ULT_KEY='X3oDMTU1M2I4YzljBGNjA3VzBHlwdWxzZQNjb25zZXJyBHB
hAy0xBHBjaWQDT01HX1BvcHVsYXJfQ2FuZGlkX0NlbGViX1Bob3Rvc19qZXNzaWNhX2FsYmFfVE5
fM0UtNzA3MDE0BHBwaWQDMTIwMTg5NDA0OARmcGNrA1I2ZHRxZ0VBBHRtcGwDaW5kZXgtbARfUwM
yNzE2MTQ5BHBpZAMxMjAyMTU0MzYzBHRlc3QDMA--';</script><!-- pbt 1202154363 - 
><script language=javascript>  
if(window.yzq_p==null)document.write("<scr"+"ipt 
language=javascript  
src=http://l.yimg.com/us.js.yimg.com/lib/bc/bc_2.0.4.js></scr"+"ipt>")
;  
</script><script language=javascript>  
 
if(window.yzq_p)yzq_p('P=HLySgUS0zpCOOnAXnkEEPL8PDJs6tUenbeEABiC8&T=13t70
v096%2fX%3d1202154977%2fE%3d2716149%2fR%3dyahoo_top%2fK%3d5%2fV%3d1.1%2fW%3d
J%2fY%3dYAHOO%2fF%3d3065009760%2fS%3d1%2fJ%3d90CEB444');  
if(window.yzq_s)yzq_s();  
</script><noscript><img width=1 height=1 alt=""src="http:// 
us.bc.yahoo.com/b?P=HLySgUS0zpCOOnAXnkEEPL8PDJs6tUenbeEABiC8&T=140i4ljqj%2fX%
3d1202154977%2fE%3d2716149%2fR%3dyahoo_top%2fK%3d5%2fV%3d3.1%2fW%3dJ%2fY%3dYA
HOO%2fF%3d42285180%2fQ%3d1%2fS%3d1%2fJ%3d90CEB444"></noscript>  
<!-- f41.www.sp1.yahoo.com compressed/chunked Mon Feb 4 11:56:17 PST 2008 
-->  
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